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[Introductory note: Arthur L. Thomas received a BA in philosophy from Cornell
University and an MBA and PhD in accounting from Cornell University and the
University of Michigan, respectively. He is the author of four books and numerous
articles on accounting topics. One of the two books from which this paper stems was
honored by the AICPA as a notable contribution to the accounting literature.
A New York State CPA, Ontario CA, and Fellow in Accounting Researchers
International Association, he is a Professor of Accounting at McMaster University in
Canada and a member of the editorial board of Abacus.
In Dr. Thomas' lecture, he will discuss allocations in accounting, which he feels are
ubiquitous. Financial accounting's allocations generally suffer from a logical defect of incorrigibility that renders
them arbitrary. Those of managerial accounting fall into two classes:

1. Aggregations of two or more costs to single cost objects. Whenever each cost is traceable to one (and
2.

only one) cost object, these allocations are legitimate and create no theoretical difficulties.
Allocations of individual costs to two or more cost objects. These are usually incorrigible and
illegitimate. Although such allocations can sometimes be rendered harmless by a process designated as
sterilization, managerial accountants should cease perpetrating them.

The lecture will conclude with a survey of possible explanations for the popularity of such arbitrary managerial
allocations in practice.]

To be able to explain a variety of phenomena consistently by a simple theory is what
we struggle to attain in theory construction. (1)
I plan to describe a few central themes of a research project begun early last summer but unlikely to
reach completion before 1977. As the title indicates, my remarks will be tentative. I emphasize this
because although my role will be to sound positive, it's almost certain that some of these remarks will
prove, in hindsight, to have been mistaken or, at least, misleading.
Your role, if you will be so gracious, is to raise objections -- yet to be forgiving if I temporarily persist
in what may seem to be folly. Stanislavsky, the famous director, maintained that to act well one must
first suffer. Similarly, to theorize well one usually must first err.
Throughout what follows, I'll use relatively simple, deterministic models. For these illustrate the

principles to be discussed quite as well as complex, probabilistic models would, while saving time. As
far as I can tell, relaxing these simplifications would not affect the conclusions that we'll reach -though, of course, you're invited to question this, too. (2)
In a recent article that summarizes research done for the American Accounting Association, (3) I claim
that defense of allocations made in financial accounting de-pends on one's being able to calculate the
contributions individual inputs make to the firm's productive processes, that such calculations inevitably
are incorrigible, and that therefore financial accounting's allocations are incorrigible, too. The technical
term incorrigible is one used by logicians, and here signifies that these calculations and allocations can
neither be verified nor refuted and that, in consequence, any one is just as good as any other.
These calculations and allocations are incorrigible because most business inputs interact -- that's to say,
they generate more output working together than they would separately. It can be demonstrated that in
the presence of interaction any attempts to isolate portions of output as contributions of individual
inputs are as meaningless as attempts, say, to attribute portions of an athlete's success to his or her
individual organs: legs, lungs, etc. The article illustrated these claims by describing a process of
manufacturing sourdough bread.
Anthony replied to a preliminary draft of this article as follows:
I must agree with you that if the problem is to "specify the individual contributions of the
inputs," then it is an incorrigible problem. If, however, one considers a different, but
nevertheless important, problem, then it is possible to make some reasonable statements
about how to allocate costs, statements that certainly are better than the assertion that one
calculation is just as good as any other.
This problem is that of measuring the cost of a cost objective. In this problem, cost
measures the amount of resources used for the cost objective. The resources themselves are
physical quantities -- for example, ounces of flour, hours of labor services, and equipment
used in making the sourdough bread. Cost measures these amounts in monetary terms so
that they can be aggregated. The governing concept -- which I think is a practical,
defensible concept -- is that the full cost of a cost objective is the sum of its direct costs
plus an equitable share of costs that are common to two or more cost objectives.
With this concept we can measure quite closely the cost of the materials and the labor, and
we can measure approximately the cost of the equipment that is applicable to one loaf of
bread. If our purpose is to measure cost so that each customer will pay an equitable amount
for the loaf of bread that he buys, no reasonable person would argue that the customer who
buys the first loaf should pay the total cost of the equipment, while the customer who buys
the second loaf should pay nothing for the equipment used to make it. There could, of
course, be arguments about the appropriate amount of depreciation, but it could not be said
that each calculation is as good as any other. (4)
This evening, I'll try to reply to these comments by Anthony and clarify the circumstances in which
allocations of costs to cost objectives are theoretically legitimate, and explore characteristics that render
certain illegitimate managerial-accounting allocations preferable to others. During the latter discussion
I'll expand a concept of sterilized allocations, introduced in earlier research, and will explore the issue
of allocations' corrigibility in more detail than was possible in the article cited. Finally, though it wasn't
written as such, this paper serves as a reply to Anthony's recent article on cost allocation. (4a)
ALLOCATIONS OF TRACEABLE COSTS
In this section I'll argue that whenever an input is traceable to an output allocation of its cost to that
output's cost is legitimate and corrigible. Unfortunately demonstrating this requires introducing a few

definitions.
Productive Relationships
Let's begin by defining a productive relationship, Y = g(Z1, Z2, ... Zk, ... Zm) , between a particular
output, Y, and a set of inputs, Z1, Z2, ... Zk, ... Zm, as one in which the output would have been
physically different (in quantity or kind) had any of these inputs not been available to the production
process that generated it -- in short, a productive relationship is what a lay person would call a causeeffect relationship. The detection such differences requires two things that, for brevity, will be assumed
(since these assumptions don't affect the analysis): first, standards of what characteristics the output, Y,
should possess to be Y, and second, standards of materiality, for deciding what differences are
significant.
Traceability to Different Levels
All of a firm's costs are traceable either to waste or to its outputs at some level of activity aggregation.
This can be seen by beginning at a high level of aggregation, then entertaining progressively more and
more detail. The following discussion, which assumes that the firm is a manufacturer, is organized in
the manner of a flowchart.
Level 1 Productive or waste. First, we might ask of any cost that the firm has incurred
during its lifetime to date: Is there a productive relationship between the related input and
any of the firm's lifetime-to-date administrative, selling, or factory outputs?
Yes: The cost is traceable to the firm's total lifetime-to-date outputs.
No: (That's to say, these outputs would have been what they were without the firm's
incurring these costs): These costs should be classified as waste.
Level 2 Year. If Yes, is there a productive relationship between the related input and the
firm's outputs in any one (and only one) year?
Yes: The cost is traceable to the firm's total outputs during that particular year.
No: The cost isn't traceable to this level.
Level 3 Administrative, selling, or factory. If Yes, is there a productive relationship between
the related input and any one (but only one) of the three types of output (administrative,
selling, or factory)?
Yes: The cost is traceable to that particular kind of output during that particular year.
No: The cost isn't traceable to this level.
Level 4 Responsibility center. If Yes, is there a productive relationship between the related
input and one (and only one) department's (or other cost, profit, or investment center's)
production of that particular kind of output during that particular year?
Yes: The cost is traceable to that responsibility center's total output during that year.
No: The cost isn't traceable to this level.
Level 5 Specific product or other output. If Yes, does the center produce only one output of
the kind in question? Or, if not, is there a productive relationship between the related input
and one (but only one) output of the kind in question?
Yes: The cost is traceable to that specific output of that center during the particular year.
No: The cost isn't traceable to this level.
Level 6 Unit of output. If Yes, is there a productive relationship between the related input
and some one (and only one) unit of that specific output?
Yes: The cost is traceable to that particular unit.
No: The cost isn't traceable to this level.

Please note that an input's cost often will be traceable to two or more levels of activity aggregation -- for
these levels tend to assume a hierarchy.
Waste and Side Effects
In practice, of course, accountants allocate to output various costs that they should have assigned to
waste, and misclassify as waste other costs whose inputs do enter productive relationships. But such
misclassifications, the fruits of error, management's reluctance to admit inefficiencies, and practical
needs to minimize accounting costs, don't affect the basic theoretical issues to be considered, and will
be disregarded henceforth.
Similarly, one can argue on theoretical grounds that some waste is an inevitable concomitant of
production and that, therefore, some waste should be allocated to any output. Here, there's a bona fide
allocation problem (that accountants try to solve intuitively). Again, I'll disregard it in subsequent
discussion because it only rarely has substantial impact on accountants' calculations. (5)
Finally, when asking whether an input affects one and only one year, type of output, responsibility
center, specific output, or unit of output, I'll respect accountants' customary materiality rule and ignore
minor, byproduct productive relationships. For example, if a firm conducts a process that requires a
minimum ambient temperature, its labor input may slightly reduce its power consumption, since the
workers supply bodily heat. But we'll disregard such side effects.
The Corrigibility of Allocations of Traceable Costs
Whenever the cost of one or more units of a particular input is traceable to output at one of the levels of
activity aggregation just described, at that level the allocation of that cost to output is corrigible. The
simplest reason why this is so is that the allocation can be verified by simple, unequivocal counting: the
units were devoted to the particular activity, and their cost is known.
We may distinguish two kinds of allocations: physical distributions of resources (with which, for
instance, economists are concerned) and notional assignments of costs and revenues (with which
financial accounts are concerned). In allocation traceable costs to output, managerial accountants simply
assign them in ways consistent with the physical distributions of the related inputs. Doing so seems to
offer scarcely any more theoretical difficulties than does preparing net-quick-assets funds statements -which, similarly, merely require counting physical distributions of cash and near-cash. In both cases the
association of dollar values with what's physically distributed seems automatic.
To be sure noncash traceable costs can provide a few allocation ambiguities. For example, there are
situations where labor costs of a particular batch of product are influenced by other output (or lack of it)
and consequent availability (or lack of availability) of different grades of labor, necessity (or lack of
necessity) to use high-seniority (high-pay and/or high-efficiency) employees, etc. But, once again, these
ambiguities will rarely be so material that they need concern us.
Nonetheless, physical distributions of inputs and notional assignments of their costs are different things.
With traceable costs, the physical distribution is unambiguous. But why don't financial accounting's
incorrigibility problems arise for the cost allocations? Here are two reasons: (6)
1. Any allocation of the input's cost to an output to which it isn't traceable can be refuted on the
simple grounds that there's no productive relationship between the input and that output -- refuted
in exactly the same way that, if I give my son a slice of bread, I can immediately confute any
suggestion that the bread's cost forms part of the costs of feeding the Prime Minister of New
Zealand. By multiple eliminations, allocation of the input's cost to the one output with which it
does have a productive relationship is the only disposition to make of that cost that can't be
refuted.

2. Financial accounting's incorrigibility problems arise from its attempts to allocate single figures
for total lifetime-to-date revenues (or cashflows) first to individual years then to multiple inputs
within each year. Such allocations are just as irremediably arbitrary as managerial accounting's
joint-cost allocations (which attempt to attribute single cost figures individually to multiple
outputs). With traceable costs, we reverse things and allocate from many to one instead of from
one to many. This reversal automatically eliminates the factor that makes financial-accounting
and joint-cost allocations incorrigible.(7) Indeed, one ordinarily would describe what's done with
traceable costs as cost aggregation, not allocation. Illustration 1 diagrams the difference between
these two situations.
Illustration 1

Allocations of Untraceable Costs
Incorrigibility becomes a potential problem in managerial accounting whenever an input isn't traceable
to one and only one output, yet management or institutional considerations force allocation of its cost.
There are two main ways in which an input may not be traceable:
1. For convenience, and to minimize accounting expense, managerial accountants don't
bother to trace certain overhead costs that, in theory, they could trace to individual outputs.
For example, often they can calculate with high precision the cost of electricity used in
manufacturing a particular batch of product. Under process costing, managerial accountants
often will allocate this cost to the product; under job-order costing, they're apt instead to
lump electricity costs with other overheads -- that's to say, not try to trace them. In the latter
instance we once again see accountants invoking a form of materiality rule.
We may perceive applications of such overheads proportionate to direct labor hours worked

(or some other index of activity) as a surrogate for corrigible, traceable allocations: as
attempts to trace in an aggregated, statistical way costs whose tracing would otherwise be
impractical. Following this logic, overhead allocations are illegitimate when accountants
use the same index to apply other costs that theory indicates are untraceable -- for instance,
to apply fixed overheads to individual units of product.(8)
2. The input is joint on two or more outputs at a particular level of activity aggregation.
Here, All the familiar dilemmas of joint-cost allocation arise. We accountants tend to
picture joint-cost problems as occurring at Level 5 (Specific product or other output): as
problems of allocating costs of a single manufacturing process to its multiple products. Yet,
identical problems arise whenever we try to:
Level 2 Year: Allocate costs common to two or more years (such as the depreciable base of a
depreciable asset) to individual years,
Level 3 Administrative, selling, or factory: Allocate costs common to administration, selling, and
manufacturing (such as certain head-office expenses) to these individual activities.
Level 4 Responsibility center: Allocate costs common to several responsibility centers (such as those of
building occupancy) to individual responsibility centers, or
Level 6 Unit of output: Allocate costs common to a batch of product (such as set-up costs) to individual
units of that product.
Horngren suggests that accountants make such allocations for three main reasons: pricing, income
determination, and inventory valuation.(9) The latter two are really financial accounting issues, and I've
dealt with them elsewhere. To pricing, I shall add one related concern: whether or not to produce the
product at all.
Decisions That Don't Require Allocations of Untraceable Costs
Let's begin by examining a situation in which allocations of untraceable costs are clearly unnecessary
and illegitimate. A group of investors is considering organizing a firm to manufacture and sell a
particular product, x, for t years, then either liquidate this firm or sell it to others. For simplicity, at first
I'll disregard taxes and waste, and assume stable input prices and that the investors are profit
maximizers. Also, I'll disregard uncertainty -- not because uncertainty is unimportant, but because I
wish to explore other, even more fundamental, issues.
The project requires an initial investment of I. The investors expect variable costs per unit of output to
be v, and each year's fixed outlays (exclusive of any amortization of I) to be fn (n = 1, ... , t). The
investors also envision some profit maximizing strategy for marketing product x. This might involve
selling all units at the same price, p, or it might happen that profit maximization requires selling
different units, i, at different prices, Pi .(10)
Under either assumption the investors expect to sell some total number of units of product, un, during
each year of the project's life. Of course, the u's and p's are ultimately functions of the estimated demand
characteristics of the product and would be calculated without reference to any accounting allocations.
The investors won't undertake this project unless they expect to obtain some minimum rate of return, r,
on their investment. Assuming a constant price for the product and that they anticipate a scrap value of
S from liquidating or selling the firm at the end of year, t, the investors will undertake this project if and
only if its net present value, NPVx, is nonnegative:
(I)

If the product's price isn't to be constant, we must substitute the expression

for (pi-v) for un (p-v)

in Inequality (I).
Since there's only one product, most of the firm's costs -- even administrative and selling costs -- are
traceable to its annual outputs of product x, and allocating them to this output would be corrigible. The
only exceptions are:
1. Any components of the annual fixed outlays that interact with other years' fixed-outlay
components. (For brevity, I'll disregard this possibility hereafter.)
2. The cost of the investment or, more precisely, its depreciable base (I - S).
There's no theoretically legitimate way to calculate the full cost (including allocated investment) of any
individual year's output -- for doing so requires joint-cost allocation. But decision-makers have no need
to calculate such full costs. For you may verify that whichever price assumption we make, neither the
decision to undertake the project nor the decision of what price(s) to charge for it require any
allocation of the initial investment's depreciable base (nor any allocation of annual fixed outlays to
individual product units, either). You should also be able to satisfy yourself that there will be no need to
allocate untraceable costs even if Inequality (I) is recast to provide for taxes, waste, price instability,
uncertainty, continuous compounding, or investors who seek satisfactory (or equitable) returns rather
than maximum profits.
Untraceable Costs Allocated Anyway; Sterilization (11)
However, it may be that the investors, like many managers, are habituated to basing their decisions on
the kinds of full-cost data used in financial accounting and, therefore, require allocation of the
investment's depreciable base. The article cited at the outset claimed that any such financial accounting
allocations would be incorrigible: no allocation method can be verified because infinitely many other
methods are just as plausible as it is, yet no method can be refuted, since each is just as plausible as any
alternative. Here, matters become slightly more complicated. Some possible allocations can be refuted;
the remainder will be incorrigible, unless unique.
Demonstrating this requires a concept introduced by my 1974 AAA study: sterilization of an allocation
method. In practice it's fairly common for decision makers inappropriately to base their decisions on
allocated untraceable costs. The AAA study gave the example of decisions whether or not to process
joint products past their splitoff points. Under circumstances specified there, management's decision
should depend upon whether product revenues, less costs to complete, are positive. Yet, some
managements may instead be concerned whether revenues less full costs (including allocated joint
costs) are positive.
The latter decision approach is inappropriate. However, one way of allocating joint costs -- the familiar
net realizable value (NRV), or approximated relative sales value, approach recommended by textbooks - has an amiable characteristic. If management does make the mistake of basing its decisions on full
costs, but calculates these costs by the NRV approach, its decisions will be identical with those that it
would have made had it used a correct approach that avoided untraceable-cost allocations. That's to say,
use of the NRV approach ensures, under these particular circumstances, that inappropriately allocating
untraceable costs won't affect the decision one way or another. Such a no-effect allocation is sterilized

with respect to the particular decision and circumstances.
Please note that sterilization is a rather odd concept. It doesn't mean "right" or "good surrogate" or
"possesses high decision-utility." Indeed, it doesn't refer so much to the allocation itself as to the
relationship between an allocation and a decision and set of circumstances. And even there, to say that
an allocation is sterilized merely means that, although it shouldn't have been made, it does no harm
because decision-makers who use it will make the same decision that they would had they used
appropriate allocation-free data instead. (One really shouldn't consult fortune tellers. But if their advice
doesn't affect one's decisions, doing so may be harmless.)
Similarly, it can be demonstrated that implicit-rate (economic) depreciation of divisional assets is
sterilized with respect to division managers' decisions whether or not to invest in new capital projects
when these managers are evaluated according to divisional ROIs.
In general this notion of sterilization attempts to isolate what research in progress indicates is a goal
common to a great variety of managerial-accounting behavior -- despite management's not being
conscious of following this goal. Thus, potentially, it offers a simple, unified explanation of much that
otherwise seems complex and disparate. Earlier research made two more points about sterilized
allocations that are important for our purposes, and which I'll illustrate presently:
1. There's no reason to expect that an allocation method that's sterilized with respect to a
particular decision and set of circumstances will continue to be sterilized for other decisions
or in other circumstances.
2. Often many allocation methods will be sterilized with respect to any one decision and set
of circumstances.
Sterilization and Corrigibility
Now, whenever a decision should be based on data free of untraceable-cost allocations but decisionmakers insist on an approach that uses them, sterilized allocations are preferable to unsterilized ones.
For an unsterilized allocation could lead the decision-makers to make an incorrect decision whereas, by
definition, a sterilized allocation couldn't. Accordingly, in such situations unsterilized allocations aren't
incorrigible -- for they can be refuted.
However, we should try to be very clear about what's going on here, even at the price of repetition.
Something has made management believe that decisions should be based on allocated data. Yet
decisions should instead be based on data free of allocations. The only ground for choosing sterilized
untraceable-cost allocations is that they don't affect decisions one way or another and are, therefore,
harmless errors. In no sense of the word does this "verify" sterilized allocations.(12) Moreover,
whenever more than one untraceable-cost allocation method is sterilized with respect to a particular
decision and set of circumstances, each individual sterilized method is incorrigible -- for each is
inappropriate, yet each avoids affecting the decision.
I'll illustrate all this by the two decisions made by our investors, assuming, for brevity, that the price
charged for the product must be constant. It should be emphasized that in both of the following
examples the investors are using foolish decision rules. For the purpose of these illustrations is to show
that even under a patently bad rule requiring untraceable-cost allocations it may be possible to select
sterilized allocations that leave decision makers in the position that they would have occupied had they
been sensible.(13)
1. Perhaps the investors will decide whether or not to engage in the project by first
calculating the product's optimal price and annual outputs (by the allocation-free analysis of
potential demand mentioned earlier ), then, for each year, comparing that price with the full

unit cost of the product plus a small markup for an equitable profit. If price always exceeds
marked-up full cost, the investors will undertake the project; if it fails to do so in one or
more years, they won't.
Calculations of annual full costs plus markup require allocating the initial investment's
depreciable base to individual years. If NPVx >= 0, any method of doing this that results in
each year's marked-up full cost being less than the optimal price will be sterilized. If NPVx
< 0, any method that results in at least one year's marked-up full cost exceeding the price
will be sterilized. For, in either event, any such allocation method will ensure that the
investors make the same decision that they would have had they followed the correct
decision approach reflected in Inequality (I) . On the other hand, any way of allocating the
depreciable base that isn't sterilized could tempt investors to make a wrong decision and,
therefore, can be refuted in this particular context of decision to be made and surrounding
circumstances. (14)
As you may readily verify, whether NPVx >= 0 or < 0, infinitely many allocation methods
will satisfy the rather modest requirements for sterilization here. Some might be more
familiar than others. But, with respect to this decision and its particular circumstances
(considered in isolation), each will be as good as the other, and each incorrigible. Any rule
to choose among them must either be arbitrary or, as we'll soon see, be based on some other
decision to be made from the allocated data.
2. For our second bad decision rule, perhaps instead, the project is so obviously profitable
that the investors decide to undertake it without first determining exactly what they'll
charge for the product. They plan to set this price by applying a percentage markup (one
regarded as equitable in the industry) to the product's full, fast-year unit cost.
Any allocation method that generates the particular first-year, full-cost figure that, in turn,
yields a marked-up selling price equal to the allocation-free, profit-maximizing price, p,
will allow the investors to follow their inappropriate decision rule yet simultaneously
maximize profits. Here, one allocation of the depreciable base to Year 1 is preferable to all
others, and any allocation method that doesn't yield this Year-1 allocation can be refuted.
But there will be infinitely many ways of allocating the depreciable base over the firm's
entire life that satisfy this Year-1 constraint yet differ in what's assigned to Years 2 through
t; each of these will be as good as any other with respect to this particular decision and
circumstances.
An Objection
By now, some listeners should have begun to feel uneasy. As Anthony argued at the outset, in both
examples surely some sterilized allocations won't be as good as others; some, in fact, will be quite
weird. For instance, in the second illustration sterilization could be attained by allocating the
"appropriate" portion of the depreciable base to Year 1, the remainder to Year 2, and nothing whatever
to any other year. Clearly (it could be argued) such an allocation approach is inferior to other, less
whimsical, ones. Thus, choice among sterilized allocation methods isn't incorrigible.
The answer is simple. As emphasized earlier, a sterilized allocation method is sterilized with respect to
a particular decision and set of circumstances. It may also be sterilized with respect to other decisions
and circumstances, but there's no reason to expect this to be so. If the allocation method in question is
inferior to others, this must be because we perceive it interfering with sonic other decision(s) -- perhaps
by generating unsatisfactory Year-2 profits and thereby tempting decision makers to raise the product's
price (or to make some other inappropriate decision). But this merely signifies that the subject
allocation method isn't sterilized with respect to other decisions.

Similar comments apply to rejecting otherwise-sterilized methods of allocating untraceable costs for
violating GAAP rules -- or, as in Anthony's objections, for violating some concept of equity. Notions of
what's equitable vary so much from individual to individual and situation to situation, and are so subject
to unintentional bias from self-interest, that one despairs of giving them analytical significance. But any
attempt to make them operational must specify that certain kinds of decisions based on certain
allocations are erroneous. For instance, to use Anthony's example, one shouldn't allocate all equipment
costs to one loaf of bread, and none to the others, then decide to base prices charged for loaves on the
resulting book costs.
Of course, decision makers who set prices by an approach free of untraceable cost allocations should
never be tempted to make such an inequitable pricing decision in the first place. Anthony's rule against
allocating all equipment costs to one loaf merely places decision makers who inappropriately base their
pricing decisions upon such allocations in the same position as they'd have occupied had they not
allocated (though only, to be sure, with respect to this particular decision).
This conclusion is equally applicable to any standards of equity (for fairness) that someone might use to
reject allocations of untraceable costs that are otherwise sterilized. Either such standards refute all of
these allocations (in which case sterilization with respect to all relevant decisions and circumstances is
impossible) or one ends up with a smaller set of allocations that now are also sterilized with respect to
the decision and circumstances implicit in the standards of equity. Thus, all that such standards do here
is to impose additional sterilization criteria upon allocations that shouldn't have been made in the first
place; and nothing in Anthony's observations or his article conflicts with the following conclusions:
1. Managerial allocations of untraceable costs (and other one-to--many allocations) are either
refutable or sterilized with respect to one or more decisions and sets of circumstances. That's to
say, they're either demonstratably wrong or without effect.(15)
2. There's no guarantee that any allocation method will simultaneously be sterilized for all the
decisions that decision-makers with to make and all circumstances in which they wish to make
them.
3. When an allocation method is sterilized with respect to one or more decisions and sets of
circumstances, there's no guarantee that it will be uniquely so.
4. When it's not unique, all sterilized methods will be incorrigible though, of course, some or all
of these could be refuted if one invoked additional decisions or circumstances.
5. If more than one method is sterilized, the accountants' final choice among them will depend
upon such considerations as ease of calculation, freedom from data problems or excessive
sensitivity to errors in parameter estimates, or familiarity.(16)
6. Finally, when one concludes that one-to-many managerial allocations must be either refutable
or sterilized, one is saying something damning about them: at best, all that can be claimed in their
favor is that they're harmless excrescences.
Two or More Products
For simplicity, we've assumed that our imaginary firm makes only one product. Let's relax this
assumption now, first by supposing that the investors contemplate the firm's making two products, x
and y, throughout its t-year life, and that sales of these products will be independent. Each product will
have its own traceable initial investment, variable cost, annual fixed outlays, and (perhaps) scrap value.
In addition, there will be joint (untraceable) initial investment costs, Ij, joint annual fixed outlays, fjn
and a joint component to the scrap value at the end of the year t, Sj. (17) For brevity, I'll assume that all
variable costs are traceable to individual products and that it's appropriate to apply the same rate of
return, r, to all calculations.

The significance of the net present value of an investment in either product changes slightly; since the
amounts of such net present values may differ from what would be calculated in a single-product case,
I'll use the following notation for them:

As before, it may be necessary to substitute the expression

for unx[px-vx] in the

foregoing.
Once again, the investors will envision some profit-maximizing strategy for marketing both products,
and will undertake both only if:
( II )

The investors must now decide what prices to charge for each product, and whether to product either x,
y or both.(18) Inequality (II) describes the criteria that these product decisions should satisfy; none of its
expressions are allocated magnitudes ( nor are any of the components of its NPV's ). Accordingly,
despite this situation's being more complex than the one reflected in Inequality (I), it's evident that our
earlier conclusions remain true: None of the decisions that investors must make require allocation of
untraceable costs, and any such allocations that investors do make will be either refutable or sterilized (
with all sterilized allocation methods being incorrigible if more than one is available ). Listeners are
invited to satisfy themselves that as long as we continue to assume a limited-life firm (and make our
earlier assumptions), these conclusions hold no matter how many products the firm manufacturers.
Moreover, we can relax the assumption that all such products are manufactured throughout the firm's
entire t-year life by substituting zero values for appropriate un's and fn's, and discounting any initial
investments that are to occur after the firm begins.
Indeed, it should be apparent that in theory none of the investor's decisions require allocation of
untraceable costs even were we to go much further in relaxing assumptions and allow uncertainty,
unstable input prices, joint variable costs, multiple rates of return, interaction of products, and an
indefinite-life firm. However we should consider two possible objections to this conclusion. At least
one author has implied that such allocations are a necessary response to a complex decision
environment. Also, the question inevitably arises: if such allocations are unnecessary, why do so many
managers make them?
Objection: Allocation as a Response to Complexity
It might be argued that once we relax Inequality (II)'s assumptions and admit more complications,
appropriate untraceable-cost-allocation free calculations rapidly evolve beyond the capacities of most or
all decision makers ( perhaps because of limited channel capacity and difficulties in making the
necessary estimates ) -- and that, as a practical matter, they must instead allocate costs that are joint to
various years, responsibility centers, and products. Wells seems to imply this in his description of the
origins of managerial accounting's untraceable-cost allocations.(19)

Specifically, it could be urged that firms must often calculate full costs for products when bidding for
new business or when deciding whether or not to undertake new products whose selling prices are
given. For instance, a parts manufacturer preparing a bid may need to estimate a minimum amount
below which this bid shouldn't fall, in the sense that if it bases all of its bids on parallel calculations it
will earn just enough to keep profits at a satisfactory level. Calculation of any such floor price requires
allocating untraceable costs to individual jobs. I shall call this the UCA (for untraceable-cost allocation)
approach to such decisions.
Someone taking Wells' general view would go on to emphasize that these are merely hypothetical
allocations, made solely for specific decisions, that they have no significance for other purposes, and
that nothing is served by booking them. Yet, if they are necessary for practical purposes, doesn't this
make them a legitimate part of managerial accounting?
There are at least two answers to this question:
1. The UCA approach entails that firms will make product decisions in series, as a
way of simplifying complex decision environments -- that's to say, make them one
product or group of products) at a time. But, if so, firms can legitimately simplify
even further by using a familiar variant of capital-budgeting analysis. Instead of
calculating individual NPV's for a multiplicity of products, they need merely regard
all products that they're currently producing as though they were a single product, x,
and the candidate product as Inequality (II)'s product y. The candidate product should
improve the profitability of the firm as a whole; therefore, the criterion for product
decisions becomes:
( III )

For brevity, I'll call this the capital-budgeting approach to deciding whether or not to
produce a product and what price(s) to charge for it. Under the capital- budgeting
approach, these product decisions are sensitive only to differential considerations.
Any complicating factors common to both NPV's drop out of the calculations.
2. The UCA approach doesn't escape any of the capital-budgeting approach's
remaining complications. For the UCA approach still requires firms to estimate
investment costs, scrap values, and variable costs -- and to develop pricing strategies.
Both approaches require making the estimates of total output to be produced and sold
that Inequality (II) demands. (In particular, whatever way the UCA approach charges
untraceable costs to units of output necessarily implies a total output over which all
such costs are to be recovered.) (20)
Similarly, the UCA approach's provisions for a minimum profit require
calculations that parallel Inequality (II)'s and (III)'s need to specify a minimum
rate of return. Other considerations such as uncertainty, equity, unstable input
prices, joint variable costs, and interactions of products affect both approaches
equally. To be sure, the UCA approach might often disregard these. But
whenever doing so is legitimate, the capital-budgeting approach can just as
properly ignore them, too.
Thus, any supposed practical advantages of the UCA approach in complex decision environments seem
illusory. Instead, it mingles theoretically illegitimate data (untraceable-cost allocations) with legitimate
data, thereby rendering an already complicated decision situation even more confusing. (21)

Objection: The Widespread Use of Allocations in Practice
Accordingly, we may conclude on both theoretical and practical grounds that managerial accountants
should eschew allocations of untraceable costs. Why, then, do we encounter such allocations in
practice?
1. One reason often offered is that financial accounting's GAAP require full-cost inventory figures. The
UCA approach provides these; the capital- budgeting approach doesn't. But this would be a satisfactory
reply only if GAAP arose independently of the managerial accounting practices, which doesn't seem to
be the case. (The same point applies to any claim that we allocate untraceable costs because we've been
trained to do so.)
2. Many-to-one allocations are legitimate. It's a natural error to suppose that one-to-many (joint-cost)
allocations, though admittedly "somewhat arbitrary," are legitimate, too.
Similarly, in our private lives we often feel confident of being able to make meaningful profit and loss
calculations on such things as sales of securities or decisions to change employment. We feel equally
confident calculating profits for very simple business ventures of the kinds that characterized capitalism
until relatively recent times. Such calculations require few significant allocations of untraceable costs.
It's only natural that we should wish to make similar calculations for today's complex business
enterprises: why shouldn't it be just as meaningful to calculate General Motors' profits, or the profits of
a responsibility center, as it is to speak of one's personal profits? Of course, such calculations do require
important untraceable-cost allocations. But we go ahead and make them anyway, soothing any
uneasiness by reasoning that such profits must exist, and that there's no way to avoid allocations if we
are to calculate them: charging zero amounts for relevant untraceable-cost factors seems clearly
refutable, therefore any systematic, consistent, plausible-sounding allocation method seems preferable
to no allocation at all.
I've argued elsewhere that this train of reasoning is defective at its root: that profit, as commonly
understood, cannot be corrigibly calculated for large enterprises, and that the analogy from personal
profits is as misleading as the classic false analogy between prudent personal savings behavior and
surplus/deficit policies appropriate to national governments. Nonetheless, as long as Society continues
to encourage this natural error, we may expect managers to continue to request profit data for
responsibility centers (rather than data about their contributions), and thus accountants to continue to
allocate untraceable costs. (22)
3. Allocations of untraceable costs are required by both the cost theory of pricing and the medieval
notion of just price in which, presumably, it originates. Neither of these will stand up to modem
analysis, but both seem deeply embedded in management thinking and in the terms of many contracts
(notably government contracts). This, and the previous discussion, suggests that some reasons for
allocating untraceable costs reflect survivals from simpler eras of business organization that have
persisted long enough to become part of our habitual ways of thought -- examples of what Schumpeter
called the ancient truth that the dead always rule the living. (23)
Unfortunately, by now any change to untraceable-cost-allocation free accounting will require extensive
reeducation and some dislocation. This, of course, perpetuates our allocation fallacies. So does the
seeming absence of potential alternatives that stems from our inurement to present practices and
resulting failure to experiment with untraceable-cost-allocation free ones.
4. Many believe that the kinds of marginal or incremental calculations involved in the capital-budgeting
approach can lead a firm to financial ruin. Here's an example. Let's suppose for simplicity that a firm
manufactures a single product and rents all of its plant and equipment. Variable costs are $3 per unit and
fixed costs $100,000 per year. The firm, which has excess capacity, produces and sells 20,000 units per
year. It must, therefore, charge $8 per unit just to break even.

Incremental analysis assures us that if the firm could legally sell additional units in a separate market
without affecting its existing sales, its total profits would increase at any selling price exceeding $3.
Yet, of course, if the firm applied this approach across the board it would go bankrupt. Moreover,
there's the additional danger that sales in the $3+ market eventually could spoil sales in the $8+ market.
Therefore, many conclude that one should allocate untraceable costs (the $100,000 of fixed costs, here)
to individual units -- at least as part of the firm's routine cost accounting.
But this conclusion simply doesn't follow. All that's really occurring here is that the firm has an
opportunity to substitute two different pi's for p in the detailed expressions that lie behind Inequality
(III). In doing so, there's no chance that choice of a low pi for the secondary market will affect the
primary market's $8 + pi one way or another. And any dangers of leakage between the two markets can
be incorporated quite as well into Inequality (III)'s untraceable-cost-allocation free, capital- budgeting
approach as they can into the UCA approach.
What these fears really seem to boil down to is a concern that if one gets used to thinking in marginal or
incremental terms one may end up disregarding fixed costs. Since the capital-budgeting approach
explicitly incorporates all fixed costs, this fear is groundless and the reason for allocating untraceable
costs collapses.
5. To many, the capital-budgeting approach may appear to be overly complex and to require estimates
of parameters that, as a practical matter, are impossible to estimate reliably. Decision makers may
therefore believe that some rule-of-thumb approach to pricing, based on traceable costs but charging an
additional percentage markup to allow for imponderables and profit, may be the best that they can do.
Indeed, if reliable estimates are impossible, such a rule-of-thumb approach may be best from a costbenefit standpoint. But please note that:
a. Although such a rule-of-thumb approach superficially resembles the UCA approach, it's
a retreat from it, too. For, as we've seen, the UCA approach requires making the same kinds
of estimates as the capital- budgeting approach does and, thus, is equally complex.
b. There's no need for the rule-of-thumb approach to involve any allocation of untraceable
costs: all it requires is a percentage mark-up over direct costs. To be sure, decision makers
may speak as though such markups were intended to cover both fixed costs and profits, but
that's merely symptomatic of the pervasive ideology of profit calculation and untraceablecost allocation, discussed earlier.
6. Relatedly, managers sometimes also believe that estimates of traceable costs tend to be understated
(or that dangers from understating them exceed those of overstatement), and that therefore some "boot,"
or safety factor, should be allowed in marginal or incremental calculations. But even if this is true,
there's no need to allocate untraceable costs in order to provide such a safety factor. Nor is there any
need to do so in order to make managers more aware of the costs incurred and benefits offered by other
parts of the organization --another rationale sometimes given for allocating untraceable costs.(24)
7. Capital-budgeting approaches are generally less attractive to decision makers than theorists might
desire. This is partly for the reasons just discussed, but partly also because of something identified by
Ijiri: a firm's divisions compete for investment funds from headquarters, and tend to make overly
optimistic estimates for long-lived projects.(25)
Although this affords an additional explanation for firms' preferring rule-of-thumb approaches, it
provides no reason for allocating untraceable costs. For, once again, the UCA approach requires
essentially the same estimates as does the capital--budgeting approach.
8. As inspection of Inequality (II) should suggest, the untraceable-cost-allocation free capital-budgeting

approach is often best adapted to global decision making by top management, whose resulting decisions
are then imposed upon responsibility centers. Such imposition may limit these centers' sense of
independence, thereby jeopardizing some of the lower-echelon creativity and elan sought by
decentralization.
The relevant question here is how much real lower-echelon independence is possible under the UCA
approach when joint input factors are significant. The gloomy literature of transfer pricing suggests that
allocation of untraceable costs doesn't really help matters here.
9. Finally, it could be argued that accountants, as practical men, really aren't trained to be terribly
sensitive to logical issues, to worry much about theory, or to be distressed by mere cognitive
dissonance. Thus, once in the habit of allocating the unallocable, we may be content to continue to do so
indefinitely, theory be hanged, as long as the practical consequences of doing so seem bearable. If this
paper has been correct, the trouble with such attitudes is that major potentials for reducing managerial
accounting costs and confusions exist that won't be realized until practical accountants come to worry
more about the intellectual foundations of their craft.
SUMMARY
We've reached the following overall conclusions. Managerial accounting's numerous many-to-one
allocations often can be verified. Our allocation problems are, instead, with one-to-many allocations.
These are theoretically illegitimate; in particular, Anthony's rationale for them and the rationale that
could be developed from Wells' work don't hold up under scrutiny.
One-to-many allocations fall into two types, depending on the nature of the allocatee -- that's to say,
upon what the cost is allocated to:
1. Allocations of total output to two or more inputs that generate it. Conceivably, the inputs
might have entirely independent (linear) effects on the production process (as when an
individual's income equals the dividends that he or she receives from two unrelated firms).
In such cases, it's theoretically legitimate to allocate the output to the individual inputs in
proportion to their separate effects -- the amounts of output that each allocatee would
generate in the absence of any other inputs.
Usually, though, inputs interact to produce output, and total output differs from the sum of
such separate effects. Here, earlier research on financial accounting's allocations (together
with this paper's analysis) indicates that all allocations must be either refutable or
incorrigible. (26)
2. Allocations of total inputs to two or more outputs generated by them. Conceivably, these
outputs might be entirely independent effects of the production process, freely substitutable
for each other and occurring in entirely variable proportions (as when one cuts either 3x5 or
4x6 filing cards out of 48x60 blank sheets). In such cases, it's theoretically legitimate to
allocate the total cost of the inputs to the outputs in ratio to the actual quantities of each
output produced.
Often, though, outputs are joint -- not independent; they occur in proportions that are partly
or wholly fixed. Here, we've seen that all allocations must be either refutable or sterilized.
And if more than one is sterilized, each will be incorrigible. In any event, it's widely
recognized by writers on managerial accounting that all such allocations are arbitrary.
Thus, accounting's basic allocation problem results from lack of independence of allocatees. We call
this lack of independence interaction when the allocatees are inputs and jointness when they're outputs.
The extreme case of input interdependence occurs when all inputs are essential (fixed input

proportions); the extreme case of output interdependence occurs when all outputs are unavoidable (fixed
output proportions). Most often, inputs and outputs are partly substitutable. But anything materially
short of full allocatee independence results in irremediable theoretical difficulties.
The upshot for untraceable-cost allocations is that all will be either refutable or sterilized -- and, if the
latter, incorrigible unless unique. Sterilization here signifies that these allocations won't affect certain
decisions made under certain circumstances. This is the very best that can be said of them: they can be
designed to be ineffectual, to lack any decision impact whatever, to be tripe.
Since such allocations complicate analyses, waste time, and cause misunderstandings, we accountants
should stop making them -- especially since research in progress indicates that untraceable-cost
allocations often can't be sterilized for all relevant decisions and circumstances simultaneously. For if,
at best, such allocations have no effect, we can obtain this no effect easier and more safely by not
allocating at all. It's just that simple.
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SELECTED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Question?
Could you for my benefit and perhaps for other as well give us a simple illustration of how an allocation
becomes sterilized.
Answer:
I wish I had some figures, because this is where figures becomes handy. As an example, let's use the
divisional depreciation calculation. You have division managers with enough autonomy that they are
allowed to propose new capital projects. A division manager starts looking around at possible projects,
and he sees one that has a very high internal rate of return. Let us say it's 30% per year; but in the early
years it has a rotten pay-out. The division manager hopes to be promoted within three or four years. If
he proposes this particular project and it is approved by top management, he will have low cash flows
and revenues in the early years. His successor will receive all the credit for the high ones. At the same
time if the firm is using straight line depreciation, he will be showing a very low rate of return for this
project. Again, his successor will be showing a splendid rate of return. If the firm is using accelerated
depreciation for book and tax purposes, he may show a disastrous rate of return on the project. In a
situation like this, the division manager is apt to make the incorrect decision of suppressing the proposal
for capital expenditure, even though the firm would benefit from it. Well now if you use economic
depreciation, the one that gives the same book rate of return in each year, the division manager will
never be tempted into doing this type of censorship of an otherwise attractive proposal. In that sense, the
use of this particular allocation method for depreciation makes him use the same criteria for selecting
projects and come to the same decision as if allocation, depreciation, and divisional net income
calculated on depreciation wasn't a factor at all. In that sense, it's sterilized.
Again you can show with joint cost allocation that as long as products don't have any positive or
negative values at split-off and you use the net realizable values approach, any product that should
receive further processing will have a positive book profit associated with it and any product that
shouldn't receive the processing will have either zero or negative book profit associated with it. If
management is so unwise as to be made uneasy by carrying products that have negative or zero book
profits, then the best thing to be done is to use the NRV approach. Whenever they do have negative or
zero profits, these are ones that management should discontinue anyway. Again you have a case where
management shouldn't be allocating at all, but should figure whether to retain or get rid of products in
terms of the contributions they make. But if they use book profits for the products, you can work out an
allocation method for the joint costs that keeps management from making mistakes.
Question:
You have given us a maximization rule for the firm. What notion do you offer for performance
evaluation and interim reporting?

Answer:
The simplest answer is that you have a cash flows notion, or rather a net quick asset flows notion. One
can evaluate individual managers or individual employees using a cash flows criteria rather than a profit
criteria. Again, I'm saying this in the abstract. In the world in which we live since everyone is geared to
think in terms of profit, this is impossible. You know even the Russians in the last 15 years have started
to reintroduce the notions of profit. At the moment we live in a society where profit is one of the central
concepts in accounting. How long it will take to get away from this I don't know. All I'm saying in the
long run, we will get away from it.
Question:
Don't you think you should emphasize the fact there really isn't any problem in accounting if there is
certainty? Shouldn't one view all these responses as an attempt to deal with uncertainty?
Answer:
It is always permissable to isolate in any scientific inquiry one problem from other problems. I agree
with you about uncertainty, it is a very important problem. On the other hand if you're examining meat
for lead contamination, you don't have to simultaneously be examining it for coliform bacteria
contamination. They are two separate problems. The uncertainty problem is being very adequately
handled by people such as Brief and Owen. I'm interested in a different problem. The only way I can get
into trouble is if the kinds of interaction problems and incorrigibility problems that I'm worried about
interact themselves with uncertainty. I've tried to set things up tonight and in my other research so that
uncertainty isn't a problem. Even in a world of certainty, the problems I'm talking about exist.

